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THE CZECHOSLOVAK APPROACH TO THE
DRAFT CONVENTION ON
JURISDICTIONAL IMMUNITIES OF
STATES AND THEIR PROPERTY
Vladimir Bola*
I.

& Monika Pauknerovd**
INTRODUCTION

The jurisdictional immunity of the State and its property, that is,
the exemption of a State from the jurisdiction of other States, is not
now regulated by a universal international treaty. The scope of international jurisdictional immunity has been at issue since at least the
fourteenth century.' Today we face two basic approaches toward the
institution of jurisdictional immunity, both of which have inherent
practical consequences. Briefly speaking, partisans of the absolute immunity concept presume that immunity will be applied to the acts of a
State in all cases except those in which a State expressly waives it.2 On
the other side, partisans of the restrictive, or functional, immunity
concept differentiate between jure imperii (sovereign) acts andjuregestionis (non-sovereign, and especially commercial) acts of a particular
State, asserting basically that immunity from jurisdiction applies to
juri imperii acts only.3 The question then arises as to where to draw
the borderline between juri imperii and juri gestionis acts, and which
4
criteria are useful to judge the activity of the State.
* Research Fellow, Institute of Law, Czechoslovak Academy of Sciences, Prague; Member
of the Law Faculty of the Charles University, Prague; JuDr., PhD.(CSc); Visiting Scholar, University of Michigan (1990-91).
** Research Fellow, Institute of Law, Czechoslovak Academy of Sciences, Prague; Member
of the Law Faculty of the Charles University, Prague. JuDr., PhD.(CSc).
I. Cf.BARTOLUS DE SASSOFERRATO (Postglossators School), TRACTATUS REPRESSALIUM,
Questio 1/3, para. 10 (1354), where one finds the origin of the now famous phrase, which in its
entirety reads: "Non enim una civitas potest facere legem super alteram, quia par in parem non
habet imperium" (There is no polity which should have power over another, because one equal
has no power over another).
2. See, e.g., L. OPPENHEIM, INTERNATIONAL LAW 239-241 (6th ed. 1947); Anzilotti,
L 'Esenzione degli stati stranieri dalla giurisdizione, 5 RIVISTA DI DIRITTO INTERNAZIONALE 477
(1910); Usenko, Immunitet gosudarstva ot innostrannojyurisdikcii i ispolnitelnykh mer (Immunity of a State from Foreign Jurisdiction and Measures of Constraint), 13 SBORNIK INFORMACIONNYKH MATERIALOV 10, 11 (1962).
3. See, e.g., I. BROWNLIE, PRINCIPLES OF PUBLIC INTERNATIONAL LAW (3d ed. 1979); G.
BADR, STATE IMMUNITY, AN ANALYTICAL AND PROGNOSTIC VIEW (1984); S. SUCHARITKUL,

STATE IMMUNITIES AND TRADING ACTIVITIES (1959).

4. For greater detail, see Bala§, Jurisdiken imunita stdtu, hleddnf kritrif zuzujefchjej rozsah
(Jurisdictional Immunity of the State, in Search of Criteria Restricting its Scope), 129 PItAVNIK
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The prevailing opinion is that immunity exists as a customary rule
of international law. However, diverging opinions of scholars on particular aspects of this rule and international practice clearly indicate
that its content is not quite crystallized and unambiguous 5 It has also
been argued that it is not possible to talk about such a rule at present
and that there is in fact a vacuum juris in this field, Le., that this issue
6
is in fact not regulated by international law.
Sovereign immunity is in many States regulated by internal legal
norms.7 Some laws on jurisdictional immunities of States were
adopted in the 1970s and 1980s.8 As far as Czechoslovakia is concerned, the exemption of a State from the jurisdiction of another State
is regulated in general by the provision of article 47, Law number
97/1963, Collection of Laws, on international private law and the corresponding procedure. 9 For a long time, this law has failed to comply
with the requirements of contemporary international relations. In the
face of heterogeneity in international theory and practice, it is desirable to agree upon a regulation of this topic in international law as soon
as possible.
This article deals with four issues:
1. The effort of the International Law Commission of the United Nations to codify jurisdictional immunity.
2. The theoretical and practical Czechoslovak approach toward the
institution of jurisdictional immunity of States and the Draft Convention, and a prediction of possible change of the Czechoslovak view.
3. The changing views of East European scholars.
348-364 (1990). See also Balai, Pauknerovi & Zemfinek, Jurisdikini imunita stdtu v
mezindrodntm prdvu (Jurisdictional Immunity of the State in International Law), 127 PRAVNIK
451-466 (1988) and sources quoted therein.
5. Cf., e.g., the views held by Anzilotti, supra note 2, at 477; L. OPPENHEIM, supra note 2, at
239-241; Weiss, La competence ou l'incompdtence des tribunaux d l'dgard des ditats itrangers, I
HAGUE ACADEMIE DE DROIT INTERNATIONAL RECUEIL DES COURs (1923); I. BROWNLIE,
supra note 3, at 320-44; M. BOGUSLAVSKU, IMMUNITET GOSUDARSTVA (Immunity of the State)
8-9 (1962).
6. This view was voiced by C. Cepelka during V. Bala§'s defense of "Jurisdik~ni imunita
stfitu" (Jurisdictional Immunity of the State) (unpublished doctoral dissertation), which took
place in Prague in June 1990.
7. See generally MATERIALS ON JURISDICTIONAL IMMUNITIES OF STATES AND THEIR
PROPERTY, U.N. Doc. ST/LEG/SER. B/20, (1982) (collection of national laws and international agreements on immunity from jurisdiction).
8. For example, in the United States, The Foreign Sovereign Immunities Act of 1976, 28
U.S.C. §§ 1602-1611 (1988), State Immunity Act of 1978 (United Kingdom), laws on immunity
of State in Singapore (1979), Canada (1981), South Africa (1981) etc., reprinted in MATERIALS
ON JURISDICTIONAL IMMUNITIES OF STATES AND THEIR PROPERTY, supra note 7, at 1-70.
9. See Z. KUCERA & L. TICHt', ZAKON 0 MEZINARODNIM PRAVU SOUKROMIEM A PROCESNIM - KOMENTAR (The Law on International Private Law and the Corresponding ProcedureCommentary) 259-268 (1989).
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An analysis of particular provisions of the Draft Convention with

respect to their acceptability by States with different socioeconomic
systems and especially by Czechoslovakia.
The article concludes that even if codification of jurisdictional immunity is initially unsuccessful because of the international disparity
of views on the subject, it may ultimately be vindicated if the codification helps promote a change and convergence of views in the long run.
II.

ORIGINS OF THE DRAFT CONVENTION ON JURISDICTIONAL
IMMUNITIES OF STATES AND THEIR PROPERTY

After many more or less succesful attempts to regulate jurisdictional immunities on the international level,' 0 the codification effort
was concentrated finally in the International Law Commission of the
United Nations (ILC). A Draft Convention was elaborated based on
the U.N. General Assembly Resolution No. 6/151 of December 18,
1977. The whole set of draft articles was adopted by the ILC at the
first reading in 1986, and substantial progress has been achieved by the
ILC in its work on the second reading of the articles. Final preparations should be followed by a diplomatic conference which would subsequently adopt the Convention."
The aim of this Draft Convention is to unify the diverging opinions
of particular States about international customary law and do away
10. For greater detail see Bala§, Pauknerovi & Zemnek, supra note 4. Among the attempts
to regulate the issue of jurisdictional immunities of States see, e.g., The Brussels Convention on
the Unification of Certain Rules Relating to Immunity of State-Owned Vessels, April 10, 1926,
and Supplementary Protocol, May 24, 1934, reprinted in G. HACKWORTH, 2 DIGEST OF INTERNATIONAL LAW 463; The European Convention on State Immunity, May 16, 1972, Europ. T.S.
No. 74; Projet de r~glement international sur la comptence des tribunaux dans les procis contre
les Etats, Souverains ou Chefs d'Etats, Institut de Droit International, 1892. For the more recent
attempts to deal with this topic within the Institut de Droit International see 45 ANNUAIRE DE
L'INSTITUT DE DROIT INTERNATIONAL, TOME II 293-295 (1954); 62 ANNUAIRE DE
L'INSTITUT DE DROIT INTERNATIONAL, TOME 1 (1987); International Law Association, draft of
Riforme et codification du droit international. projet d'une convention sur I'immunitd en droit
international, submitted by Professor K. Strupp in REPORT OF THE THIRTY-FOURTH CONFER-

ENCE, VIENNA 426-440 (1926).

For more recent attempts to deal with this topic within the

International Law Association see REPORT OF THE FORTY-FOURTH CONFERENCE, COPENHA-

GEN 204-217 (1950); REPORT OF THE FORTY-FIFTH CONFERENCE, LUCERNE V-VIII (1952);
REPORT OF THE SIXTIETH CONFERENCE, MONTREAL, 5-10, 325-348 (1982); Report of the Sub-

Committee of the League of Nations Committee for the Progressive Codification of International
Law, 22 AM. J. INT'L L. 118 (Special Supp. 1928) (Conclusions of M. Matsuda, Rapporteur for
the Sub-Committee of the League of Nations Committee of Experts for the Progressive Codification of International Law, October 11, 1926); Draft Convention on Competence of Courts in Regard to Foreign States in HARVARD LAW SCHOOL, RESEARCH IN INTERNATIONAL LAW 451
(1932).
11. Tomuschat, Jurisdictional Immunities of States and Their Property--The Draft Convention of the International Law Commission, in LAW OF NATIONS, LAW OF INTERNATIONAL ORGANIZATIONS,

WORLD'S ECONOMIC LAW (LIBER

HOHENVELDERN) 603 (1988).

AMICORUM

HONOURING

IGNAZ

SEIDL-
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with variances which, as far as its interpretation is concerned, remain
among States.12 The Draft is the result of many years of work to get
the partisans of absolute and restrictive immunity to compromise.
The Draft should then be a good starting point for the further development of mutual relations, especially economic ones, between States
with different systems of proprietary relations, economic and political
orders, and different levels of economic development. When elaborating the Draft, the ILC began with the presumption that the formulation of individual rules will provide an opportunity for their further
progressive development and accelerate the adoption of new rules reg13
ulating related questions.
The Draft of the international codification on the jurisdictional immunity of States has been accepted rather positively by the States
themselves. 14 Generally speaking, the spirit of compromise in the
Draft raises hope that it will be accepted by States, which take different positions as far as the question of immunity in the sphere of nonsovereign activity of a State and its agencies and instrumentalities is
concerned. The proposed regulation attempts to find the most precise
rules, which should envisage some level of legal certainty on the question of how a particular case will be reviewed; the regulation's approach is pragmatic. From the point of view of the effectiveness of the
regulation of relations within the international community, the most
perfect internal legal regulation should compete only slightly with
rules adopted at the international level within the framework of the
United Nations.' 5
Existing municipal internal legislation on the jurisdictional immunity of a State is one of the points of departure as well as an inspiration
for the international rules which are being prepared by the ILC. But it
is difficult to unify municipal law through international conventions
and treaties. It is complex to harmonize proposed provisions emanating from different legal cultures, various systems of proprietary relations, and differing ideas about the role of legal codification.
Another important source of legal inspiration of the ILC Draft
Convention is the European Convention on State Immunity of 1972,
12. Cf sources cited supra note 5.
13. Cf. Report of the Commisission to the General Assembly on the Work of its 31st Session
2(2) Y.B. INT'L L. COMM'N 185-186 (1979), U.N. Doc. A/CN.4/SER.A/1979/Add. I (Part 2)
[hereinafter Report of the Commission].
14. See Jurisdictional Immunities of States and Their Property, Comments and Observations
Received from Governments. U.N. Doc. A/CN.4/410 (1988) [hereinafter Comments].
15. For examples of international regulations see MATERIALS ON THE JURISDICTIONAL IMMUNITIES OF STATES AND THEIR PROPERTY, supra note 7.
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which is binding on several West European States.1 6 The European
Convention is itself also a compromise, although it significantly favors
the restrictive approach to State immunity. Different legal standpoints
are very often accompanied by distinct political views and economic
interests that are hidden behind the elaboration of the Draft. Unlike
the situation in the past, this is especially relevant to developing countries with a strong public sector in industry. Indebted States can invoke immunity against countries who press international claims to
17
recover their loans.
III.

THE CZECHOSLOVAK POSITION ON THE IMMUNITY OF
STATES FROM JURISDICTION

In principle, Czechoslovakia now supports the Draft Convention
on Jurisdictional Immunities of States, although it did not push the
more progressive approach at the very outset of the codificational
work. This was especially true with respect to the exceptions to immunity, or the cases to which immunity does not apply. The Czechoslovak standpoint was determined to a considerable extent by the
position of the East European countries as a whole and it was quite
obvious that the "common" approach of these States was derived from
their vassalage to the USSR, its foreign policy, and its political
supremacy in economic relations. The USSR still bases its position on
the concept of absolute immunity.18 Besides the official position of the
USSR, the concept of absolute immunity was also for years handed
down by the vast majority of Soviet international law scholars, who it
seems were more apologetic than was really necessary. 19 However,
Soviet commercial practice took a different and more realistic step:
that of not claiming the immunity of the State while engaged in commercial transactions, at least with commercial partners from the West.
20
This more realistic approach is to be traced also in Soviet civil law.
The practice of Czechoslovak foreign trade was analogous to the
USSR's in this respect. On the other hand, the official Czechoslovak
16. The European Convention on State Immunity, May 16, 1972, Europ. T.S. No. 74. See,
e.g., Sinclair, The European Convention on State Immunity, 22 INT'L & CoMP. L.Q. (1973); C.
SCHREUER, STATE IMMUNITY: SOME RECENT DEVELOPMENTS (1988). See also MATERIALS
ON JURISDICTIONAL IMMUNITIES OF STATES AND THEIR PROPERTY, supra note 7, at 156.

17. Although such a tactic to avoid repayment of debt is largely hypothetical at present, one
should not exclude the possibility of its use.
18. See especially Yurisdiktsionnye immunitety gosudarstv i ikh sobstvennosti (Jurisdictional
Immunities of States and Their Property), U.N. Doc. A/CN.4/371 (1983) (Memorandum by N.
A. Ushakov) [hereinafter Memorandum].
19. Cf M. BoGUSLAVSKI), supra note 5.
20. See sources in Bala§, Pauknerovi & Zeminek, supra note 4, at 461-62.
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position derives from the principle of the absolute immunity of a State,
which, as was mentioned by the press spokesperson of the Czechoslovak ministry of foreign affairs in 1988, is allegedly based on interna21
tional customary law.
This opinion was announced in connection with the decision of the
Austrian Supreme Court concerning the construction of nuclear
power stations in Czechoslovakia. 22 In the case of Georg Maier v
CSSR, 23 the court considered the question of whether Austrian courts
were competent to enjoin the construction on Czechoslovak territory
of the nuclear power station Mochovce, whose effects, according to the
Austrian plaintiff's argument, would endanger his land located in
Austria only 115 kilometers away. The Supreme Court held that the
court in Korneuburg was locally competent.
According to the official Czechoslovak view, the Austrian judiciary has no authority to entertain actions of this character, and therefore does not respect the principle of absolute immunity of States as
sovereign members of the international community. 24 The Czechoslovak ministry of foreign affairs mentioned expressly that the decision of
the Supreme Court of Justice was inconsistent with international law.
If we put aside the rather complicated question of Czechoslovakia's
standing as a defendant in this case, the question of the immunity of a
State and its agencies and instrumentalities in cases of non-sovereign
activity clearly appears. It is necessary to point out that the Supreme
Court concluded that the Maier case dealt with jure gestionis actions,
and that such actions have not been excluded from the jurisdiction of
25
Austrian courts since the early fifties.
I share the opinion that the concept of absolute immunity of States
and their property is untenable today. The practice of distinguishing
between jure imperii andjure gestionis acts, which has been respected
by international commercial practice with greater or smaller vicissitudes for many years, has started to gain ground in the last couple of
years, even among East European scholars, albeit slowly and rather
sporadically. To illustrate this process, let us survey briefly the development of the jurisdictional immunity doctrine in the East European
21. Bezpfikladng' akt vmgovini do nagi svrchovanosti (An unprecedented act of interference
into our sovereignty), Rud6 Privo (Czechoslovakia), Apr. 23, 1988, at 2 [hereinafter Bezp['ikladng, akt].
22. Id.
23. Austrian Supreme Court, exhibit number 5 Nd 509/87
24. Bezpiikladn9 akt, supra note 21, at 2.
25. See the decision of the Austrian Supreme Court in the Dralle case, 17 INT'L L. REP. 155
(1950), reprinted in Seidl-Hohenveldern, State Immunity: Austria, NETHERLANDS Y.B. INT'L L.
97, 101-102 (1979).
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view of international law. 26

East European scholars also uphold the opinion shared by the majority of distinguished international legal scholars that State immunity
is a rule derived directly from the principles of the mutual independence of States, their sovereign equality, and their dignity.
Boguslavskij provides one of the most comprehensive surveys of
issues having a bearing on the jurisdictional immunity of the States
presented by Socialist legal science. He holds the view that in economy, science, and culture, every State enters into legal relations of ambiguous character: first, legal relations arising between States, and
second, legal relations in which the State acts only as one of the parties. Then he accentuates that the State does not act as two legal persons-for example as Public Treasury and as the subject of sovereign
authority-but rather that the State is unique even though the manifestations of its activity can vary. 27 Boguslavskij, Usenko, Ushakov,
and many others argue that the State does not proceed in civil law
relations as an ordinary civil law entity and that in foreign trade relations it does not deal as a subject of international law: in the latter
case, the State acts as a subject of civil law "sui generis.' '28 However,
in my opinion this assertion is not a satisfying answer to the question
of why the State should be granted immunity as a participant in legal
relations which are substantially different from those administered by
public international law in the framework of which State immunity
applies.
The views of Soviet legal science on the position of the State participating in civil (commercial) law relations with foreign private parties
are changing. In their work, Luntz and Braginski focus on the delimitation of State property funds acting in internal and external
relations.

29

As for the proper law governing the acts of the State, Boguslavskij
argues that they are determined by the municipal law of the respective
State and by international law, but they are never regulated by the
laws of another State. It follows from this in principle that in the civil
30
law relations of the State it is necessary to apply its municipal law.

I find this opinion correct as far as the relations within the limits of
26. For a more extensive review see V. Balag, Jurisdik~ni imunita stitu (Jurisdictional Immunity of the State) (unpublished doctoral thesis, Prague, April 1989) 40-44, 85-162.
27. M. BOGUSLAVSKIJ, supra note 5, at 8-9.
28. Id. at 14.
29. Luntz & Braginski, Gosudarstvo kak subyekt grazhdanskogo prava, in SUBYEKTY
GRAZHDANSKOGO PRAVA (Subjects in Civil Law) 268 (S. Bratus ed. 1984).
30. M. BOGUSLAVSKIJ, supra note 5, at 14.
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the State's territorial jurisdiction are concerned or in the cases in
which the use of its municipal law is required by the appropriate conflict of laws rule. Otherwise it could be considered an unauthorized
extension of the jurisdiction of the State beyond the frontiers of its
territorial sovereignty. If we accepted Boguslavskij's concept in this
respect, we should also accept the concept that the State acts in a privileged way, which would not correspond with the opinion that these
particular relations are comparable to civil law relations which are
characterized by the equality of its subjects. Boguslavskij shares the
view that a contract in which one of the parties is the State has a civil
law character and is regulated by the municipal legislation of the respective State, and not by the laws of the other contracting party or by
international law, unless agreed otherwise. 31 The law to be used (the
proper law) can be determined by agreement of the contracting parties
and can be based on the principle of choice of law generally accepted
by the private international law of contracts.3 2 If the parties have not
agreed on the proper law, it is necessary to use the municipal law of
the State-contracting party. The civil law obligations of the sovereign
State can in no case, unless the State gives its explicit consent, be subjected to the operation of foreign law.3 3 However, this interesting proposal, which reflects a standpoint opposite to that of the ILC Draft,
has not been generally accepted.
The fact that many States have enacted the laws providing that
immunity will be granted to the State only in cases in which the State
acts in its sovereign capacity is, as stressed by Ushakov, due to the
dispositive character of the State immunity rule.3 4 As concerns the
critical review of restrictive immunity, the advocates of absolute immunity in socialist States have drawn attention to the untenability of
35
splitting the State as a legal entity.
Remarkable opinions appeared in this respect in Hungary in the
eighties. Mfidl and VWkis drew the conclusion that Hungary may accept the action of a foreign forum in a legal dispute otherwise subject
to exclusive Hungarian jurisdiction, and considering that this is based
on reciprocity, a Hungarian court may also adjudicate a similar civil
or commercial law dispute of another State. Thus, conclude Midl and
31. Id. at 14-15.
32. Id.
33. Id.
34. Memorandum, supra note 18, at 5.
35. See zourek, Some Comments on the Difficulties Encountered in the JudicialSettlement of
DisputesArising from Trade Between Countries with Different Economic and Social Structures, 86
JOURNAL DU DROIT INTERNATIONAL 639, 641 (1959) (on the concept of absolute immunity).
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Vkis, in addition to waiver of immunity and the relevant international treaty, reciprocity represents the acceptance of functional or relative immunity. 36 Another Hungarian author, Bragyova, shares the
opinion that there is undoubtedly a trend towards the restriction of
State immunity to jure imperii acts of State, in contradiction to jure
gestionis acts which are supposed to fall outside the operation of the
37
rule of immunity.
According to Enderlein, the unity of policy and economy, on
which the rejection of the restrictive theory was based, excludes
neither the differentiation of various functions of the socialist State,
nor the division of labor among State instrumentalities. 38 He states
expressly that the theory of absolute immunity did not correspond
with the interests of the German Democratic Republic and its
39
practice.
In principle, some Czechoslovak authors admitted the possibility
of distinguishing between jure imperii and jure gestionis acts of the
State, although in another connection than that of State immunity,
namely that of taking natural resources from the high seas and using
outer space. 40
On the other hand, Ushakov states that the theory of restrictive
immunity is untenable, because it is aimed at the subjection of one
State to the jurisdiction of another State, which in its substance is contrary to the principles of sovereignty, sovereign equality of the States
and non-interference in their internal affairs. 41 However, even the
Declaration on the Principles of International Law of 1970 does not
include immunity among the elements of sovereignty. 42
36. See F. MADL & L. VKAs, THE LAW OF CONFLICTS AND FOREIGN TRADE 118 (1987).

37. Bragyova, Reflections on Immunity of Statesfrom the Point of View of InternationalLaw,
in QUESTIONS OF INTERNATIONAL LAW 44 (1986).
38. F. ENDERLEIN, DIE IMMUNITAT DER STAATEN IM GEGENWARTIGEN VOLKERRECHT:
ZUM AUSSCHLUSS KOMMERZIELLER AKTIVITATEN IM ENTWURF DER V6LKERRECHTSKOMMISSION DER VEREINTEN NATIONEN, PROBLEME DES V6LKERRECHTS 41-42 (1987):

"Die Ablehnung der Theorie der funktionellen Immunitit des Staates stiitzte sich u.a.
darauf, dao fur den sozialistischen Staat die Einheit von Politik und Okonomie, die Einheit
von politischer Macht und sozialistischem Eigentum an den Produktionsmitteln als der 6konomischen Grundlage der Gesellschaft und des Staates charakteristisch ist. Diese Einheit
schlieBt aber weder eine Unterscheidung verschiedener Funktionen des sozialistischen
Staates - wie z.B. die Schutzfunktion, die wirtschaftlich-organisatorische Funktion, die kulturell-erzieherische Funktion u.a. - noch eine Arbeitsteilung zwischen verschiedenen Organen des Staates aus. Auch hinsichtlich des Handelns einzelner staatlicher Organe und
Einrichtungen kann zwischen der Ausiibung staatlicher Titigkeit und der Teilnahme am
Zivilrechtsverkehr unterschieden werden."
39. Id. at 53.
40. t. CEPELKA & V. DAVID, UVOD DO TEORIE MEZINARODNIHO PRAVA (Introduction to

the Theory of International Law) 180 (1983).
41. Memorandum, supra note 18, at 5.
42. Declarationon the Principles of InternationalLaw Concerning Friendly Relations and
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The aim of the restrictive theory is to secure the legal protection of
the State's subjects. The consequence of such protection can doubtless
cause the subjection of a State to the jurisdiction of another State. If
the question is put as it was done above by Ushakov, the means seem
to have changed place with the purpose. 43 This critical view of the
restrictive immunity was reflected also in Ushakov's evaluation of the
Draft Convention on the Jurisdictional Immunities of States and their
Property as elaborated by the ILC.44 Ushakov submitted his own contribution on how to solve the questions of immunity at the same time
the Special Rapporteur's efforts were criticized. In Ushakov's view,
first, the State can prevent its physical and juridical persons from making contracts with foreign States. Second, the State, by way of agreement, can receive the consent of another State to its subjection to the
local courts of the first State for certain categories of acts. Third, the
State can ensure that its physical and juridical persons conclude contracts only on condition that they include clauses on the settlement of
disputes by the appropriate court or by arbitral clauses. In addition,
every State has the right to diplomatic protection of its natural and
45
legal entities.
The question arises whether this proposal, apart from not harmonizing the existing legal disparities, takes into account in all respects
the necessity of avoiding illogical hindrances to the course of further
development of economic cooperation among States. Moreover, the
proposal contrasts with the recent opinions of other scholars in East
European States.46 Especially in light of the current fundamental
changes in Central and Eastern Europe, one can expect States will
shift considerably towards restrictive immunity. We can trace this
shift in most of the Western countries (with some exceptions) to the
47
fifties.
In this context, one can appreciate the position of Czechoslovak
Cooperationamong States in Accordance with the Charter of the United Nations, 24 October 1970,
G.A. Res. 2625, 25 U.N. GAOR Supp. (No. 28), U.N. Doc. A/25 (1970).
43. Memorandum, supra note 18, at 5.
44. Id.
45. Id. at 7.
46. See, e.g., Lopuski, Imunitjet obcego panstwa w sprawach zwiazanych z handlem zagranicznym, in PROBLEMY PRAWNE HANDLU ZAGRANICZNEGO 45 (1982); F. MADL & L. VtKAS,
supra note 36; Bragyova, supra note 37; F. ENDERLEIN, supra note 38.
47. See, e.g.. practice in the United States (The "Tate Letter," 26 DEP'T ST. BULL. 985
(1952): "For these reasons it will hereafter be the Department's policy to follow the restrictive
theory of sovereign immunity in the consideration of requests of foreign governments for a grant
of sovereign immunity."), in Austria (Dralle v. Republic of Czechoslovakia, Supreme Court, 17

INT'L L. REP. 155, Official Collection SZ XXIII, No. 143 (1950)), and in the Federal Republic of
Germany (Claim against the Empire of Iran, Federal Constitutional Court, BVerfGE 16, 27, 45
INT'L L. REP. 57 (1972) (the Charkiv, Iranian Embassy case)).
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experts, which was addressed in the Commission for Legal Questions
of the Council of Mutual Economical Assistance (CMEA) within the
framework of the 1988 discussion of the report on legal questions concerning the conclusion of diagonal contracts (treaties) in the field of
economic and scientific-technical cooperation. The Czechoslovak delegation held the view that in these relations persisting in absolute immunity is only a serious obstacle to the further normal development of
economic and scientific-technical relations between interested States.
Irrespective of this view, which did not obtain any support in the
CMEA, this sphere of legal relations was ruled by the principle of
absolute immunity until now. The practice is such that States must
48
always waive their immunity in each particular contract.
The conception of the jurisdictional immunity of States should be
reevaluated in Czechoslovakia in accordance with current trends in
the development of jurisdictional immunity. This reflects requirements of international economic cooperation and also practical concerns of unilateral bestowing of privileges on other States. Even before
the relevant internal legislation is adopted, 49 a broad field of opportunity is opening for Czechoslovak diplomats and experts to help prepare and support the future international Convention on State
Immunities within the United Nations.
IV.

A

COMMENTARY ON THE DRAFT CONVENTION ON

JURISDICTIONAL IMMUNITIES OF STATES AND THEIR

PROPERTY

Convention5 °

The Draft
is structured as follows:
Part I. Introduction
Part II. General Principles
Part III. [Limitations on] [Exceptions to] State Immunity
Part IV. State Immunity in Respect of Property from Measures of
Constraint
Part V. Miscellaneous Provisions 5t
48. Regarding the discussion of the Report, see Kohout, Prdvnfpovaha a rejim diagondlnich
smluv v oblasti hospoddiski a vddeckotechnickd spoluprdce (Legal Nature and Regime of Diagonal Contracts in the Sphere of Economic and Scientifico-technical Cooperation), ARBITRZNI
PRAXE No. 3, 80 (1989).

49. Admittedly, this topic cannot claim a priority in the fray of today's revolutionary legislative changes.
50. Ogiso, Third Report on JurisdictionalImmunities of States and Their Property at 1-2,
U.N. Doc. A/CN.4/431 (1990).
51. Part VI, on the settlement of disputes, was not subject to discussion in the Commission,
or was not included in the Draft approved by the Commission on its first reading. See Ogiso,
PreliminaryReport on JurisdictionalImmunities of States and Their Property 136, U.N. Doc. A/
CN.4/415 (1988), in which the provisional text of this part is published.
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The fundamental assumption of the Draft is that in general a State
is immune from jurisdiction. The Draft then enumerates the cases in
which it is not possible to claim immunity. 52 These cases, which are
enumerated exclusively in Part III, are not considered imperative
norms and are supposed to be in force only if the States do not agree
otherwise. In my view, this pragmatic approach of the Draft should
be stressed.
A. An Overview
Part I consists of five articles and concerns mainly the extent of the
application of the Draft, defining terms and interpretation.
Article 1 lays down that the provisions of the present convention
relate to the immunity of a State and its property from the jurisdiction
of the courts of another State. The scope of application should include, then, not only exceptions to the jurisdiction of another State, as
concerns State property, but everything else which is connected with
this question. One can just add that the ILC probably shared the
opinion that it is relatively more advantageous to adopt an incomplete
treaty regulation based on compromise, rather than continue a
disagreement.

53

Articles 2 (use of terms) and 3 (interpretative provisions) share the
same purpose, i.e., to define and specify the meaning of the terms
"4court," ''commercial contract," and "State."
"The court" means an organ of a State, however named, entitled to
exercise judicial functions.5 4 It is left to the internal laws of States to
define judicial functions. Such functions differ with particular constitutional and legal systems; they can be performed together with the
legal steps at different levels, before or in the course of a proceeding, or
at the final phase of execution. These functions can include, according
to the commentaries used hitherto, the court's decision on cause or
dispute settlement, decisions on legal and factual matters, preliminary
and enforcement measures in all stages of legal proceeding and further
administrative and executive functions which are currently exercised
by the adjudicative bodies of a State in the course of proceedings and
regulated by procedural and administrative rules.
"Commercial contract" includes any commercial contract or
transaction for the sale or purchase of goods or the supply of services
52. These are provisionally called, in the alternative, "limitations on" or "exceptions to"
immunity.
53. Cf. Report of the Commission, supra note 13.
54. Cf Ogiso, supra note 50, art. 2, para. l(a), at 6.
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and any contract for a loan or other transaction of a commercial, industrial, or professional nature, but not including a contract of employment of persons. 55 In determining whether a contract for the sale
or purchase of goods or the supply of services is commercial, references should be made primarily to the nature of the contract, but the
purpose of the contract should also be taken into account if, in the
practice of that State, that purpose is relevant to determining the non56
commercial character of the contract.
This is one of the key provisions of the whole proposed regulation.
Therefore this provision, as well as the process of defining basic terms,
attracts great interest from States. A fundamental question is the criteria for determining the commercial contract: both the nature and
the purpose criteria are closely related in the present formulations. At
the same time, purpose as a criterion for determining the commercial
or non-commercial nature of a contract appears neither in the European Convention on State Immunity and Additional Protocol 7 nor in
particular internal regulations.5 8 Its incorporation into the relevant
provision was requested earlier by other States, especially by socialist
States, including Czechoslovakia. The Czechoslovak proposal was to
take into account the purpose of a contract if in the practice of the
respective State this purpose is relevant for the determination of the
non-commercial nature of a contract.5 9 The newly proposed formulation concerning the purpose of the contract 6° corresponds with this
request more or less; it raises certain doubts, mainly as concerns the
procedure of the forum when examining the practice of the State to
which the immunity should be granted. Therefore, it would be more
convenient to delete the criterion of the purpose of a contract. This
would also contribute to strengthening legal certainty, because it
55. Id., art. 2, para. 1(b).
56. Id., art. 3, para. 2. For the second reading, the Special Rapporteur M. Ogiso proposed
the formulation in fine (Le., concerning the purpose of a contract), that the courts of the State of
the forum are not precluded from taking into account the governmental purpose of a transaction.
See Ogiso, supra note 50, at 9, 11. A question remains about the acceptance of this compromise
solution, which gives priority to evaluation on the internal State level before the general definition. The solution should perhaps be acceptable in those States where a similar lex fori already
exists; the majority of States would consider that the purpose criterion does not provide legal
certainty.
57. See MATERIALS ON JURISDICTIONAL IMMUNITIES OF STATES AND THEIR PROPERTY,
supra note 7, at 156.
58. See generally id.

59. Regarding the Czechoslovak position, see Jurisdictional Immunities of States and Their
Property, Comments and Observations Received from Governments 3, U.N. Doc. A/CN.4/410/
Add.5 (1988).
60. Ogiso, supra note 50, at 9.
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would not depend upon necessarily subjective considerations on the
side of the decision-making forum.
The expression "State" includes a State and its various organs of
government, political subdivisions of a State which are entitled to perform acts in the exercise of sovereign authority of a State, agencies or
instrumentalities of a State to the extent that they are entitled to perform acts in the exercise of State sovereignty, and representatives of a
State acting in that capacity. 6' This interpretative provision could
strictly delimit those entities and persons entitled to invoke immunity
in cases in which a State can claim it and determine at the same time
those organs and political subdivisions which are entitled to invoke
immunity, as far as they perform acts connected with the exercise of
sovereign authority. It is less important what we call them (agency,
instrumentality, and so on), than that we ascertain the kind of activity
that each respective entity performs. Such entities can succesfully invoke immunity while exercising acts of sovereign authority.
The definition of the term "State" was found to be unsatisfactory,
mainly by socialist States, due to the insufficient distinction drawn between a State and its legal entities (juridical persons) as provided in the
present Draft. 62 Although these juridical persons administer State
property, they have a legal personality distinct and independent from
that of a State; they are separate legal subjects. These persons act on
their own behalf having their own proprietal liability, they are not liable for State obligations, and the State is not liable for these juridical
persons' obligations. Therefore, some States expressly request to exclude State enterprises or entities established by a State from the definition of "State." The new article 11 bis has been proposed to regulate
this issue in particular. There is, however, the formulation in the most
recent report, concerning the definition of the term "agencies" and
"instrumentalities" itself, which proposes that the entities set up by a
State for the purpose of performing commercial transactions and
which have a distinct legal personality as well as a procedural capability not be included. 63 Since it remains possible to invoke State immunity in the performance of official functions, from the Czechoslovak
point of view, it is possible to accept this supplementary provision not
only with respect to the Czechoslovak legal order, but also to Czechoslovak interests abroad.
The immunity of particular constituent states of the federal State is
61. Id., art. 3, para. 1., at 6.
62. Id.
63. See id. at 8.
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also mentioned in the last proposal. This question likewise could
eventually be important for Czechoslovakia, with a view to the further
clarification of the conception of a Czech and Slovak federation in foreign relations."
The structure of articles 2 and 3 was changed significantly in the
course of preparatory work. It would be worthwhile to join these articles and define the terms, except for those already mentioned, as "judicial functions" and "State property." Unification of the text was also
65
proposed by the Special Rapporteur.
The two final articles of Part I are not as controversial. Article 4
(privileges and immunities not affected by the present articles) aims to
prevent possible overlap with the international conventions which regulate the status, privileges, immunities, and material conditions of individual representatives of States. 66 The proposed regulation does not
deal with the privileges and immunities attributable, according to international law, to the heads of States rationepersonae. Article 5 deals
with the non-retroactivity of the present convention, which is already
regulated by the international law in force. 67
B.

General Principles

Article 6 (State immunity) was one of the most controversial provisions from the very beginning. In its present form it sets forth that a
State is immune from the jurisdiction of the court of another State
with respect to itself and its property, in accordance with the provisions of the Draft and the relevant rules of international law. Long
discussions concentrated on this provision mainly because it deals with
the basic rule of State immunity. 68 Some States proposed to follow the
example of the European Convention on State Immunity and Additional Protocol of 1972, in which article 15 provides that contracting
64. Id. at 7 (newly proposed art. 2, para. 2(b)).
65. Id. at 9.
66. Mainly the following Conventions: Vienna Convention on Diplomatic Relations, opened
for signature Apr. 18, 1961, 500 U.N.T.S. 95, entered into force Apr. 24, 1964; Vienna Convention on Consular Relations, opened for signature Apr. 24, 1963, 596 U.N.T.S. 261, entered into
force Mar. 1967; The Convention on Special Missions, opened for signature Dec. 16, 1969, G.A.
Res. 2530, 24 U.N. GAOR Supp. (No.30), at 99, U.N. Doc. A/7630 (1969), entered into force
June 21, 1985; Vienna Convention on the Representation of States in Their Relations with International Organisations of a Universal Character, opened for signature Mar. 14, 1975, U.N. Doc.
A/Conf.67/16 (1975); Convention on Privileges and Immunities of the U.N., I U.N.T.S. 15, 90
U.N.T.S. 327 (adopted by the General Assembly Feb. 13, 1946); Convention on the Prevention
and Punishment of Crimes against Internationally Protected Persons, including Diplomatic
Agents, opened for signature Dec. 14, 1973, 1035 U.N.T.S. 167, entered intoforce Feb. 20, 1977.
67. See art. 28 of the Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties, opened for signature May
23, 1969, 1155 U.N.T.S. 331, entered intoforce Jan. 27, 1980, U.N. Doc. A/CONF.39/27 (1969).
68. Cf discussions in the ILC Yearbooks since 1978.
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States may invoke immunity from the jurisdiction of the courts of another contracting State, unless the proceedings fall under articles 1 to
14 and the court declines to entertain such proceedings even if the
69
State whose act is to be sued upon does not appear before the court.
Of course, this proposal met with strong opposition from partisans of
the absolute immunity principle. 70 Finding the point of departure for
setting down the general principle was complicated not only with respect to the different approaches of legal theories when determining
the nature of immunity, but also with respect to the basis of
7
immunity. '
The Draft of this article embodies the presumption which is in fact
shared by the advocates of both theories, that is that acts performed
while exercising sovereign authority are undoubtedly entitled to immunity. 72 Further on, the views differ. One side asserts that immunity is the exception to the principle of territorial sovereignty of the
State of the forum and that it could be proved as such in every particular case. 73 The other side considers State immunity as a rule derived
directly from the general principle of international law, i.e., the principle of State sovereignty. 74 Irrespective of how substantial the divergences between these approaches are, it is possible to reach the
conclusion that both granting and refusing to grant immunity are
parts of the same rule of international law.
It follows unambigously from the commentary to article 6 that this
Draft of the regulation as a whole is a typical example of the attempt
to reach a compromise. States agreed tacitly that they will not slip
into theoretical discussions during the second reading and that taking
up the formulation of this provision will be restricted to that part of
the proposed text which is laid down in square brackets, i.e., that
which refers to the relevant rules of general international law. 75 Since
1978, this issue has been discussed widely within the ILC as well as in
the Sixth Committee. States inclined to keep this part of the text argue above all that State practice is in statu nascendi and that the codifi69. MATERIALS ON JURISDICTIONAL IMMUNITIES OF STATES AND THEIR PROPERTY, supra

note 7, at 160.
70. Cf discussions in the ILC Yearbooks since 1978.
71. Id.
72. Cf sources cited supra notes 2, 3.
73. For an examination of the theory underlying this view, see T. GIUTrARI, THE AMERICAN LAW OF SOVEREIGN IMMUNITY 6 (1970).
74. For an examination of the theory underlying this view, see L. OPPENHEIM, supra note 2;
Zourek, supra note 35, at 641. But cf G. BADR, supra note 3; Chief Justice Marshall's opinion in
The Schooner Exchange v. M'Faddon, II U.S. (7 Cranch) 116, 135-147 (1812).

75. See Ogiso, supra notes 50, 51.
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cation could not obstruct the further development of this topic. 76
Other States, including Czechoslovakia, propose to delete the abovementioned part, arguing mainly that keeping it in the text would allow
for different interpretations. Considering the requirement of legal certainty, I share the opinion that it would be more convenient indeed to
delete the part laid down in the square brackets; contingent controversies about the question of what is to be considered as "relevant rules of
general international law" would seriously endanger the success of the
77
whole compromise.
Article 7 (modalities for giving effect to State immunity) says that
a State shall give effect to State immunity under article 6 by refraining
from exercising jurisdiction in a proceeding before its courts against
another State. 78 This means that the obligation of the State of the
adjudicating forum to grant immunity to a foreign State is limited to
situations in which the State claiming immunity is entitled thereto
under the express provisions of the Draft Convention.
The last articles of Part II, i.e., article 8 (express consent to the
exercise of jurisdiction), article 9 (effect of participation in a proceeding before a court), and article 10 (counter-claims), are to be considered as classical provisions which necessarily follow a legal regulation
of this kind. I share the view that they do not contradict Czechoslovak practice and therefore do not cause any difficulty from the Czech79
oslovak point of view.
C. Limitations on and Exceptions to State Immunity
The alternative title of Part III of the Draft Convention indicates
that until now there has been no accord reached among the States as
to how to call the cases when it is not possible to claim immunity. The
advocates of the restrictive concept prefer the term "limitation on" the
immunity of a State, 80 since according to this conception, international
law does not grant immunity for certain fields of activity. On the
other hand, those States that still consider State immunity to be absolute,8 1 prefer the term "exceptions to" immunity.
This question should probably be solved in a neutral compromise,
76. Cf. Ogiso, supra note 50, at 13.
77. See, e.g., Greig, Specific Exceptions to Immunity under the InternationalLaw Commission's Draft Articles, (pt. 2), 38 INT'L & COMP. L.Q. 560, 587 (1989).
78. Ogiso, supra note 50, art. 7, para. 1, at 14.
79. Cf Greig, Forum State Jurisdiction and Sovereign Immunity under the International Law
Commission's Draft Articles, (pt. 1), 38 INT'L & COMP. L.Q. 243, 252 (1989).
80. The United Kingdom deserves particular mention here. See Ogiso, supra note 51, at 66.
81. This is in substance the Brazilian position. See id.
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since one cannot realistically expect the most resolute partisans of one
or the other opinion to budge in favor of the opposite conception. One
proposed solution is a neutral formulation, such as "activities to which
'82
immunity does not apply."
The question of the title is purely a formal one. Part III as a whole
includes the enumeration of cases in which immunity cannot be invoked, whatever the title will be. The provisions of Part III are of a
very practical nature; they are, as concerns their content, the most
important provisions of the whole Draft Convention: this very
enumeration is the Draft's focus, the very purpose of the whole codification of the rules on State immunity.
The detailed regulation of Part III intends to regulate those cases
in which it is not possible to claim immunity: commercial contracts
(art. 11); State enterprises (art. 11 bis); contracts of employment (art.
12); personal injuries and damage to property (art. 13); ownership,
possession, and use of property (art. 14); patents, trademarks, and intellectual or industrial property (art. 15); fiscal matters (art. 16); participation in companies or other collective bodies (art. 17); Stateowned or State-operated ships engaged in commercial service (art. 18).
These cases are further supplemented by the rules concerning the effects of an arbitration agreement (art. 19) and by the relatively isolated
provision on cases of nationalization (art. 20).
As for the given examples (arts. 11-18), it can be generally pointed
out that except for the provisions on "commercial contracts" and
"State enterprises" the possibility is, at the very outset of every case,
given to the States concerned to agree otherwise.8 3 That is, this regulation is only of a dispositive and not compulsory nature and it does
not prevent States from agreeing to a different solution of a case.
A survey of cases in which, according to the consensus reached by
the States, it will not be possible to claim immunity highlights the
boundaries ofjure imperii acts. We shall now turn our attention to the
cases which are the most important and the most interesting from the
Czechoslovak point of view.
1. Commercial Contracts
The first and probably most important exception to the general
rule on immunity is found in article 11. According to this article, if a
State enters into a commercial contract with a foreign natural or juridical person, and, by virtue of the applicable rules of private interna82. Cf Ogiso, supra note 50, at 20.
83. See Ogiso, supra note 50, arts. 12-18.
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tional law, differences relating to the commercial contract fall within
the jurisdiction of a court of another State, the State is considered to
have consented to the exercise of that jurisdiction in a proceeding arising out of that commercial contract, and accordingly cannot invoke
immunity from jurisdiction in that proceeding. This does not apply if
a commercial contract was concluded between States or on a government-to-government level, or if the parties to the commercial contract
have otherwise expressly agreed.
This article is among the most debated, 84 which is understandable,
since in practice it probably will be one of the most common cases in
which a State is not able to invoke immunity. The formulations of
article 11 presented now are considered in a very critical way. We can
mention the criticism of the superfluous accumulation of criteria, according to which immunity is granted or refused. Besides the criterion
of a commercial contract itself,85 there is the criterion of implied
waiver of immunity, which is redundant not only from the point of
view of the partisans of the conception of restrictive immunity (since
the immunity is not granted with respect to commercial contracts),
but also from the point of view of the Draft as well. It is therefore
possible to assume that they were deleted by the Special Rapporteur in
the most recent versions of the Draft. 86 The third criterion is the exception in a case, when a commercial contract is concluded between
States or at the government-to-government level, which is also redundant with respect to the wording in paragraph 1. Criticism is often
provoked by reference to the rules of private international law, which
in this case has procedural significance, especially due to the lack of an
explicit provision on the territorial link, on the legal relation between
the commercial contract and the State of the forum. 87 This reference
is effective enough in determining the competent court and neutral in
such a degree to become acceptable for all States.88
At the end of the proposed article 11, the opportunity is given to
the parties to the commercial contract to regulate the method of eventual dispute settlements by express agreement. This means that it can
be agreed in an arbitration clause that the court in any State, or that
the jurisdiction of regular national courts, can be excluded and re84. See, e.g., Comments, supra note 14.
85. Cf Ogiso, supra note 50, art. 2, at 6.
86. See Ogiso, supra note 51, at 69; Ogiso, supra note 50, at 20.
87. Such misgivings were expressed by the governments of Denmark, Finland, Iceland, the
German Democratic Republic, Norway, and Sweden. See Comments, supra note 14.
88. See Comments, supra note 14, at 51 (the position of Great Britain); Ogiso, supra note 50,
at 21 (the Special Rapporteur's most recent view).
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placed by some forms of arbitration. In contrast to following articles,
article 11 does not expressly provide the possibility for a State of the
forum and a State whose immunity is at issue to agree to a different
regulation. 89
2.

State Enterprises

Article 11 bis did not appear in the original proposal. It has been
included recently by the Special Rapporteur, M. Ogiso, and was submitted in the version changed on the basis of remarks received from
the ILC. 90 According to the new proposal, if a State enterprise engages in a commercial transaction with a foreign natural or juridical
person, the State enterprise is subject, with respect to differences relating to the commercial transaction, to the same rules and liabilities as
applicable to a natural or juridical person. The State may invoke immunity from jurisdiction of the court of the forum State with respect
to that commercial transaction. However, if a State enterprise engages
in the commercial transaction on behalf of a State, article 11 shall apply. 9 1 According to the commentary, this means that a State, in contrast to a State enterprise, can in such cases invoke immunity, if this is
not a case of commercial contract (or transaction) as intended by article 11, in which case a State cannot invoke immunity. State enterprises are excluded from the term "agencies and instrumentalities of
the State, ' '9 2 and that should be appreciated.
The significance of this provision is to be seen in its differentiation
between State property and the property of a State enterprise. It
should be clear from this provision that the State is not liable for the
obligation of a State enterprise and vice versa. Because of the abovementioned requirement, article 11 would then protect both the State
and its property and the State enterprise more effectively from attempts to satisfy claims against the State or State enterprise from any
other property belonging to the State or State enterprise, though it
could seem that these two types of property are indistinguishable.
As currently submitted, the formulation of article 11 bis would
probably not be accepted by States because it is insufficiently meticulous and intelligible. The intent of the legislator is not seen until we
89. See Ogiso, supra note 50, at 20-21.
90. Id. at 21.
91. See id. at 21. The term "commercial transaction" is the term proposed by the Special
Rapporteur in all cases as the alternative to the term "commercial contract." I do not share the
view that this new terminology would change anything. In addition, the term "commercial contract" is quite deep-rooted and as such is also used in other international instruments.
92. Cf id., art. 3, at 6.
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read the commentary. 9 3 I find it worthwhile to include this case expressly among those in which it is not possible to invoke immunity.
3. Personal Injuries and Damage to Property
Another provision that attracted criticism was article 13, as recommended by M. Ogiso in the PreliminaryReport on JurisdictionalImmunities of States and Their Property (May 20, 1988). 94 This article
provided that, unless otherwise agreed between the States concerned,
the jurisdictional immunity of a State cannot be invoked in a proceeding which relates to compensation for death or injury to a person or
damage to or loss of tangible property if the act or omission which is
alleged to be attributable to the State and which caused the death,
injury or damage occured in whole or in part in the territory of the
State of the forum (unlike the original, the recommended article did
not require that the author of the act or omission be present in that
territory at the time of the act or omission).
The first objection here is that this issue should be covered partly
by international State responsibility, or possibly by the liability of
States. The codification of both topics is being prepared within the
framework of the ILC at the present time. 95 On account of this fact, a
special second paragraph was proposed, according to which paragraph
1 of the above mentioned provision would not apply to rules of inter96
national law on State responsibility (liability was not mentioned).
Another opinion calls for the complete deletion of this article, because
the illegality of an act or omission attributable to the State should be
determined by international law and because such proceedings do not
97
fall within the competence of national courts.
The passage including the condition that the author of an act or
omission was present in the territory of the State of the forum at the
decisive time was rightfully kept in the recent version of the Draft, in
93. Id. at 22.
94. Ogiso, supra note 51 (art. 13, as recommended by the Special Rapporteur).
95. Cf Report of the InternationalLaw Commission on the Work of its Forty-FirstSession
(1989), U.N. Doc. A/CN.4/L.443 (1990), at 41-50 (State Responsibility), 50-63 (International
Liability for Consequences Arising out of Acts not Prohibited by International Law).
96. See Ogiso, supra note 51, at 82. The proposed paragraph 2 deals only with "State responsibility" and does not take into account "international liability." It would perhaps be better
if article 13, paragraph 2 read as follows: "Paragraph I does not affect rules concerning State
responsibility and liability under international law." Article 13 deals with insurance contracts.
The proposed amendment of article 13, paragraph 2 is only illustrative, since the Special Rapporteur has withdrawn his alternative version of this article and returned to the text adopted on
first reading.
97. Cf Comments, supra note 14; Ogiso, supra note 51, at 83-84.
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spite of pleas that the damage should not be limited to that territory. 98
This provision has its practical significance and should be preserved in the intended convention. The language of the provision as
recommended by the Special Rapporteur would probably cover the
cases of requests for damages arising under conditions indicated in the
case of Georg Maier v. CSSR, 99 assuming that the damage was caused
and that both respective States are parties to the Convention. The
Draft Convention on "international liability," however, deals with
similar cases. As was already mentioned above, t°° this Convention
likewise is elaborated within the ILC.
Let us now turn back to the arguments of the former press spokesman to the Federal Ministry of Foreign Affairs of the Czechoslovak
Republic.' 0 ' Among other arguments, the Czechoslovak official release asserts that the Czechoslovak State does not act abroad (in this
case) as a business actor and that it does not engage in commercial
contracts with foreign companies. In the practice of Czechoslovak
foreign trade, foreign trade relations are entered into exclusively by
the Czechoslovak juridical subjects, established under article 13 of
Law number 42/1980, Collection of laws, on economic relations
abroad. These juridical persons dispose of their own property and are
liable for their own obligation up to the value of their property.
Therefore, the Austrian organs of justice do not have jurisdiction
stemming from the so-called concept of functional immunity to take
up actions concerning the enjoining of the construction of nuclear
power stations on Czechoslovak territory.' 0 2
This argumentation was not quite correct. There are several questions here that should not be mixed. From the point of view of the
redrafted and then withdrawn article 13, there was no damage caused
up to now; this is the official Czechoslovak argument in favor of the
assumption that the Austrian courts have no legal authority to entertain the legal proceeding concerned.' 0 3 It is worthwhile to add that
rather than damages, the enjoining of construction was sought; this
action is not by itself excluded a priori'°4 and it is not possible to ap98. See, e.g., Delaume, Sovereign Immunity and Public Debt, 23 INT'L LAW. 811, 815-819
(1989).
99. Cf. Austrian Supreme Court, supra note 23.
100. See sources cited supra note 95.
101. Bezp'ikladn, akt, supra note 21.
102. See id.
103. See id.
104. Provided the Austrian Court has subject matter jurisdiction, it is obliged to take up an
action filed by an Austrian citizen. The fact is that a Court in one State cannot order that the
other State or its juridical or natural persons refrain from some activity which is not to be per-
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peal to the circumstance that no damage was caused up to now. The
second question, however, is alleged damage itself. If real damages
were sought, the Czechoslovak reasoning would not stand the interpretation of proposed article 13 of the Convention, since article 13
does not require the condition, for the jurisdiction of the courts of
another State, that a foreign State should act as a merchant or business
actor. The version of article 13, as proposed by Special Rapporteur
M. Ogiso, which was withdrawn at the end, did not even require that
the author of the act or omission be present in the territory of the State
of the forum at the time of causing the damage, and according to article 13, it would be necessary to allow for a case of this kind to be taken
up before the foreign courts.
Unfortunately, the Czechoslovak official position has other weak
spots. Arguments connected with the foreign trade activity of Czechoslovak foreign trade enterprises are already completely beyond the
realm of the dispute. In the given case, neither the question of the
foreign trade activity, nor the subject of foreign trade relations is addressed. What is sought here is the stopping of construction, and the
action should probably be brought against the investor, i.e., against the
Slovak power supply enterprise. The action brought against the CSSR
would then be dismissed by the Austrian court due to the lack of
Czechoslovakia's standing as a defendant. The plaintiff G. Maier
would subsequently bring another action, aimed directly against the
above-mentioned enterprise, and, assuming the Court has jurisdiction,
it would apparently be impossible to avoid taking up the action on the
merits. The plea of immunity can in no case hold out whether the
action is brought against the Czechoslovak State or against the Czechoslovak State enterprise. Our last observation concerns a purely formal aspect: submitting the protest to the Austrian Government
through the mediation of the Federal Ministry of Foreign Affairs cannot affect the decision-making of the court since the courts in Austria
are quite independent and they are, moreover, obliged to take up the
action. 10 5
In the future, it will therefore be necessary to accept bitter reality
and admit that in this field, invoking immunity will be irrelevant.
Other cases in which it is not possible to invoke immunity, included in the Draft Convention, can be considered satisfactory from
formed within the territorial jurisdiction of that Court and which, moreover, is not illegal per se
and does not cause any harm. Even if such a decision were adopted, which is very improbable, it
would be very difficult to enforce it and it would be, in the words of Gabba, a real "monstruosit6
juridique."
105. See Bezpiikladn' akt, supra note 21.
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the Czechoslovak point of view, and it is not necessary, with respect to
the limited range of this article, to deal with them in detail. 106
Article 19 (effect of an arbitration agreement) provides that if a
State enters into an agreement in writing with a foreign natural or
juridical person to submit to arbitration differences relating to a commercial contract or a civil or commercial matter, that State cannot
invoke immunity from jurisdiction before a court of another State
which is otherwise competent in a proceeding which relates to the validity or interpretation of the arbitration agreement or the arbitration
procedure or the setting aside of the award, unless the arbitration
agreement otherwise provides. As is seen in this provision, the principle of implied waiver of immunity is used.
Entering into an arbitration agreement between a State and a foreign person does not mean that the State would by this act waive immunity with regard to the basis of the legal relationship, which is the
subject matter of eventual dispute. In another view, the existence of
an arbitration agreement means that the State does not wish to waive
its immunity in some disputes, and therefore accepts arbitration as a
means of out-of-court dispute settlement procedure.10 7 A State can
avoid the eventual court review and conclude an agreement concerning the settlement of a dispute before the independent, autonomous
arbitration, which is not subject to court review. The arbitration that
takes place under the auspices of the International Chamber of Commerce (ICC) or the International Centre for the Settlement of Investment Disputes between States and Nationals of Other States (ICSID)
can serve as an example. The court can play some role even in these
cases, in respect to the measures of coercion.
Substantially heterogeneous opinions exist regarding the alternative texts in square brackets of article 19, i.e., "commercial contract"
and "civil or commercial matter." Czechoslovakia 08 is convinced
that it is more precise to use the term "civil or commercial matter" in
article 19, as the term "commercial contract" has too narrow a meaning. I share this opinion.
Article 20 (cases of nationalization) has not been very well received.' 0 9 It states that the provisions of the present articles shall not
prejudge any question that may arise in regard to extraterritorial effects of measures of nationalization taken by a State with regard to
106. For example, see the cases arising under articles 14-18.
107. This is the Bulgarian position. See Ogiso, supra note 51, at 105; Comments, supra note
14.
108. Comments, supra note 14, at 3.
109. See id.
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property, movable or immovable, industrial or intellectual. A number
of States commented that the meaning and the proper scope of this
article are far from clear. Some States assert that the measures of nationalization, as the acts of sovereign authority, are not subject to the
jurisdiction of a court of another State; I can agree with this assumption. Many standpoints, including the position of the Special Rapporteur M. Ogiso,I 10 therefore favor deleting this article. Article 20
presents the clause containing the general reservation to the cases in
which it is not possible to invoke immunity: in such situations, it
would be possible simply to refer to this reservation and it would not
be necessary to prove an act jure imperii in a complicated way.
D. State Immunity with Respect to Propertyfrom
Measures of Constraint
This part of the Draft does not deal only with immunity from execution, but also with immunity in the sphere of various preliminary
and temporary measures of constraint which can occur in judicial
practice (e.g., arrest and the preliminary attachment of property).
Among other things, such measures of constraint make it possible to
attach property of those States against which unrecoverable claims exist and which guaranteed such claims. Provisions of Part IV can thus
be of considerable importance in practice.
In its original version, adopted at the first reading, the Draft derives from the general principle of immunity with respect to measures
of constraint, to which are then foreseen exceptions.
According to article 21 (State immunity from measures of constraint), in connection with a proceeding before a court of another
State, a State enjoys immunity from measures of constraint on the use
of its property or property in its possession or control, unless the property is specifically in use or intended for use by the State for commercial-non-governmental-purposes"' and has a link with the object of
the claim, with the agency or instrumentality against which the proceeding was directed, or has been allocated or earmarked by the State
for the satisfaction of the claim which is the object of that proceeding.
Article 22 (consent to measures of constraint) lays down that a State
cannot invoke immunity from measures of constraint in connection
with a proceeding. before a court of another State if and to the extent
that it has expressly consented to the taking of such measures with
110. See Ogiso, supra note 50, at 34.
111. The term "non-governmental" has until now been used as an alternative or complement
to the term "commercial." I am of the opinion that the term "commercial" is sufficient; it is also
used in the Draft more often.
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respect to that property by international agreement, in a written contract or by a declaration before the court in a specific case. Consent to
the exercise of jurisdiction under article 8 shall not be held to imply
consent under Part IV of the present articles, which require special,
separate consent. Article 23 enumerates specific categories of property
of a State that are not to be considered as property specifically in use
or intended for use by the State for commercial-non-governmentalpurposes. In particular, this includes property that is in the territory
of another State and is used or intended for use for the purposes of the
diplomatic and other missions (special missions, missions to international organizations, consular posts) or delegations to organs of international organizations; property of military character; property of the
central bank or other monetary authority of the State which is in the
territory of another State; property forming part of the cultural heritage and property forming part of an exhibition of objects of scientific
or historical interest which is in the territory of another State, and that
' 12
is not placed or intended to be placed there on sale.
As a second alternative, M. Ogiso submits the proposal in which
articles 21 and 22 are combined into one provision; this alternative,
like the original one, is based on the principle of immunity, followed
by a more precise formulation of exceptions.11 3 The provision enumerating specific categories of property is proposed as article 22. A new
article 23 is proposed which provides that if State property, including
segregated State property, is entrusted by the State to a State enterprise for commercial purposes, the State cannot invoke immunity from
a measure of constraint before the court of the forum State with respect to that property. 114 This new proposal is understood as a logical
consequence of the newly included article 11 bis, dealing with property
of State enterprises.' 15 It is possible to consider this rule as a broadly
used and established custom by now; because it increases legal certainty, it is not necessary to object to it. As submitted by the Special
Rapporteur, both alternatives are acceptable from the Czechoslovak
point of view.
E. Miscellaneous Provisions
These are above all the provisions of a technical legal nature,
which relate to procedural questions. Because in a concrete case the
112. See Ogiso, supra note 50, at 35-40.
113. See id. at 36-37.
114. Id. at 38.

115. Id. at 21.
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solution of these questions can have an impact on decision-making on
the merits, one cannot overlook them.
In these provisions the Draft seeks a certain unification of procedural rules of different legal systems. The provisions of Part V should
prevent the application of the procedural norms of the law of the forum, which should probably, according to some of the legal orders, be
applied against a foreign State as a party to a proceeding, and the use
of which does not seem to be convenient, with regard to the participation of a State. "16 Both the content and form of the provisions of Part
V are in principle acceptable to Czechoslovakia.
Article 24 (service of process) regulates in detail the means of service of documents instituting a proceeding to a foreign State: common
means are foreseen in international practice. 1 7 A State that appears
before the court on the merits in a proceeding instituted against it may
not thereafter assert that service of process did not comply with the
8
provisions of previous paragraphs." 1
Article 25 (default judgment) provides that no default judgment
shall be rendered against a State except on proof of compliance with
paragraphs 1 and 3 of article 24 and the expiration of a period of time
of not less than three months from the date of such service. A copy of
a default judgment is transmitted with a special three-month time
limit for a contingent measure of State challenging the judgment (an
appeal, for example).
According to article 26 (immunity from measures of coercion) in
connection with a proceeding before a court of another State, a State
enjoys immunity from any measure of coercion requiring it to perform
or to refrain from performing a specific act on pain of suffering a monetary penalty. This provision is closely followed by article 27 (procedural immunities) which provides that any failure or refusal by a State
to produce any document or disclose any other information for the
purpose of a judicial proceeding should entail no consequences other
than those which relate to the merits of the case. In particular, no fine
or penalty shall be imposed on the State for this reason. Similarly, a
State is not required to provide any security, bond, or deposit to guarantee the payment of judicial costs or expenses.
The final provision of Part V, article 28 (non-discrimination), is of
a slightly different character. It provides that provisions of the present
articles shall be applied on a non-discriminatory basis as between the
116. See id. at 42.
117. In detail id., paras. 1-3, at 41.
118. Id., para. 4.
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States that are Parties thereto. However, discrimination shall not be
regarded as taking place where the State of the forum applies any of
the provisions of the present articles restrictively because of a restrictive application of that provision by the other State concerned and
where States agree to extend to each other treatment different from
that which is required by the provisions of the present articles. This
provision generally follows article 47 of the Vienna Convention on
Diplomatic Relations. 1 9 It is worthwile to include it in the Convention on Immunities and it is also acceptable from the point of view of
Czechoslovak law. 120 On the other hand, one must admit that the
proposed provision still has not earned its place in the Convention and
some States propose to delete it.121 Therefore, discussion on this topic
is for the time being postponed to such time as general consensus is
reached on the preceding articles.
Similarly, the discussion on Part VI (settlement of disputes) was
122
temporarily put aside.
IV.

CONCLUSION

Analysis of the Draft Convention on Jurisdictional Immunities of
States and their Property shows that the codification of this field of
law is necessary and fruitful not only on a global scale, but also from
the point of view of particular Czechoslovak interests. Even though it
is not yet certain whether the Draft will be accepted by a sufficient
number of States, 2 3 its actual impact on the development of international customary law in this field is of such importance that it could
lead to the gradual overcoming of the current differences. This will
probably be the greatest importance of the Draft Convention. The
119. In relevant part, the Vienna Convention on Diplomatic Relations, supra note 66, states:
Article 47
1. In the application of the provisions of the present Convention, the receiving State shall
not discriminate as between States.
2. However, discrimination shall not be regarded as taking place:
(a) where the receiving State applies any of the provisions of the present Convention
restrictively because of a restrictive application of that provisions to its mission in the sending State;
(b) where by custom or agreement States extend to each other more favourable treatment than is required by the provisions of the present Convention.
120. Article 47, Law number 97/1963 Collection of Laws, does not provide, in connection
with jurisdictional immunity, a condition of reciprocity: The legal position, as provided with the
provision of article 28 of the Draft consequently sets a more advantageous position for Czechoslovakia than the position provided by Czechoslovak national (internal) law.
121. Cf Comments, supra note 14.
122. Cf Ogiso, supra note 51.
123. States which strongly adhere to the doctrine of absolute immunity and some States
whose internal legal regulation of this topic goes far beyond the compromise regulation proposed
by the ILC will probably not accept the Draft.
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concern and the initiative of many Member States of the United Nations justifies the prospects that the Draft Convention will be formally
accepted.
Regarding international trade, relations between States are developing all the time. Realistically, one must admit that until now no
unambiguous rules of international customary law were created in this
field and that not all legal arguments in favor of the rule of absolute
immunity of States and their property have been overcome. It is
therefore necessary to codify the field of international legal relations
on the international level and proceed as pragmatically as possible,
irrespective of the fact that some views of partisans of one or the other
conception of State immunity will prevail in the final codification.

